How do programmatic policies impact clientelism? Leveraging the exogenous assignment of the snow subsidy in Japan, we show that programmatic policies reduce the cost of exiting a clientelistic relationship. As a result, incumbents need to funnel even more clientelistic goods toward beneficiaries. Thus, programmatic policies can lead to a concentration of clientelistic resources on beneficiaries, with deleterious consequences for everyone else.
Institutionally disadvantaged legislators, such as those selected via reserved seats, try to be active in bill sponsoring to compensate for their lack of power in the legislative process. Using the case of Pakistan, I show that reserved seat legislators propose more bills and cosponsor with a larger number of peers than non-reserved seat legislators. They also occupy structural positions in the cosponsorship network that bridge different partisan blocs of legislators.
Does regime transition have a long-lasting effect on political preferences? We utilize repeated cross-sectional surveys and present robust evidence that those who experienced a regime change tend to show more conservative preferences later in life.